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Summary findings
The "human capital earnings function"  (HCEF) has  *  It uses data efficiently.
become a fundamental tool in research on earnings,  *  It is flexible, allowing for easy incorporation of
wages, and incomes in industrial and developing  variables appropriate  for a particular study.
economies. It is accepted procedure in litigation about  *  And the coefficients of the HCEF are devoid of
earnings, such as cases involving the value of lost  units, facilitating comparisons across space (such as
earnings due to injury, death, or discrimination. It is also  countries) or across time periods (such as decades).
often used to make educational policy decisions based on  In estimating the rate of return from schooling, the
estimates of the rate of return from schooling.  coefficient of the schooling variable is often interpreted
The HCEF relates the natural logarithm of earnings to  as the rate of return from schooling. This may be the
investments in human capital measured in time, such as  correct interpretation  but Chiswick shows that in
years of schooling and years of post-school work  principle - and in many circumstances - it is not.
experience. Among its desirable features:  He also discusses the effects on the coefficient of
*  It is not an ad hoc specification; it is derived from  schooling of the treatment  of the labor supply (weeks
an identity. So the coefficients of the equation  have  worked and hours worked per week) and other measures
economic interpretations.  of labor market outcomes, such as occupational status.
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I.  Introduction
The "human capital earnings function" (HCEF) has become a fundamental tool in
research on earnings, wages and incomes in developed and developing economies.'  It is an
accepted procedure in litigation involving earnings,  such as cases involving the value of lost
earnings due to injury, death or discrimination (see, for example,  Gastwirth,  1988 and
Federal Judiciary Center,  1994).  It is also frequently used to make educational policy
decisions based on estimates of the rate of return from schooling (see,  for example,
Psacharopoulos  and Mattson,  1996).
The basic feature of the HCEF is that it relates the natural logarithm of earnings to
investments in human capital measured in time, such as years of schooling and years of post-
school work experience.  It has several desirable features:
(1)  It is not an ad hoc specification.  It is derived from an identity. As a
result, the coefficients of the equation have economic interpretations.
*  Research Professor,  Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago.  This
paper was written while Barry Chiswick was a Visiting Scholar in the Education Group, Human
Development Department,  World Bank.  He appreciated the comments received on an earlier
draft from Harry Patrinos,  George Psacharopoulos and Jee-Peng Tan.
I  The simple schooling version was first developed in Becker and Chiswick (1966), and
extended to include on-the- job training in Mincer (1974).(2)  Because of the positive skewness of earnings and the rise in earnings
inequality as schooling level increases, by using the natural logarithm
of earnings rather than earnings as the dependent variable the residual
variance in the HCEF  is less heteroskedastic and the distribution of the
residuals is closer to normal.
(3)  It is an efficient user of data.  Although data on earnings, years of
schooling and years since leaving school are readily available,  data on
individual schooling costs are not readily available.  The HCEF
procedure  involves converting a relationship between earnings and
dollar investments in human capital to one between the natural
logarithm of earnings and years of investment in schooling and training.
(4)  The HCEF is flexible, allowing for easy incorporation of additional
variables appropriate for the particular purpose of the study.
(5)  Finally,  the coefficients of the HCEF are devoid of units,  facilitating
comparisons across space (e.g.,  countries) or across time periods (e.g.,
decades).
One feature of the HCEF  is its frequent use for estimating the rate of return from
schooling.  The coefficient of the schooling variable is often interpreted as the rate of return
from schooling (see, for example, Psacharopoulos and Mattson  1996, Ram 1996, Rosen
1987, Willis  1986).  While this may be the correct  interpretation in some circumstances,  it
will be shown here that in principle,  and in many circumstances,  this is not the correct
interpretation.  This paper will also discuss the effects on the coefficient of schooling of the3
treatment of labor supply (weeks  worked and hours worked per week) and other measures  of
labor market outcomes, such as occupational  status.
II.  Derivation  of the Coefficient
Por simplicity  of presentation,  what follows in this section  will ignore post-school
investments  in on-the-job  training and other variables, and will focus exclusively  on the
schooling  variable.  Let:
Eo  = Earnings if there is no schooling,
Et =  Earnings received each year after obtaining t years of schooling,
C, = Dollar amount of investments  in year t of schooling,
r,=  Rate of return on investments  in year t of schooling,
K, =  Ct . E, l = Investment  in level of schooling  t relative to a full-year's potential
earnings if investments  were not made in this level of schooling.
If there is one period of investment  in schooling  for the individual,  earnings after
schooling  is completed are:
(1)  El  = Eo +  r,C,  = Eo +  r,K1 EO=Eg(1  +r,K ,)
For two periods:
(2)  E2 = El + r2C2=E,  + r 2K2E, = E,(1  +r2K)=EO(I +rK,()(  +r2K)
Using the principle of mathematical  induction,
s
(3)  Es = E.  I| (1+r,kt)
t-1
where S is the number of years of schooling  completed. Taking natural logarithms,4
s
(4)  LnE,  = LnE 0+F  Ln(l+rtKt)
If rtK, is small, we can apply the ruleregarding natural logarithms Ln (1  +e)  =  for
small values of E.'  Then,
(5)  LnE 5 = LnE.  +  S  (r/K)
t=1
Separate values of  rYK,  can be estimated for each level of S, either  individual years or
groups of years (grade level).  For simplicity of exposition, assume r, and K, do not vary with
years of schooling (r 0 =  rt for all t and Ko =  Kt for all t).  Then,
(6)  LnE, = LnE 0 + (r0K.)S.
2  For alternative values of Ln(1 +E):









The smaller is  e, the closer is the approximation  Ln(1 +e)  e5
III.  Interpreting  the Coefficient
Adding a residual to equation (6) and estimating  the regression  equation, the coefficient
of schooling  is an estimate of the average percent increase in earnings per year of
schooling.' Note that the coefficient  of S is not the rate of return from schooling, but rather
is rK.  If the parameter K is known and the regression  coefficient  (b) is estimated, the rate of
return from schooling is  r  = b/K.
The parameter K  =  1 if the investment  in schooling  equals the full-year potential
earnings if there were no further investment. This assumption  was made to simplify the
exposition in the orginal formulation  of the specification  (Becker  and Chiswick, 1966).  This
assumption  is also made in later treatments (see, for example, Mincer 1974, Willis 1986,
Rosen 1987, Psacharopoulos  and Mattson 1996). In most estimates  of the rate of return
from schooling  using the HCEF there is no acknowledgment  that this assumption  is made;
the coefficient  of schooling  is just accepted  as the rate of return from schooling.
There are certain circumstances  in which K= 1.  Ct = El  1 can occur, for example, if
there are no out-of-pocket  costs (Cd = 0) and the foregone earnings or opportunity  cost (Cf
= Et, 1 ) is a full year's earnings. It would also occur if, for example, opportunity  costs were
75 percent of full-year  potential  earnings and it just so happened  that direct costs were
equivalent  to 25 percent.  However, K need not equal unity.  Consider a case in which the
direct costs of school are fully funded by the govermment,  including  books and school
3 Mincer (1974) shows that the coefficient  of schooling  (S) is biased downward if years of
labor market experience is not included  in the equation.6
supplies.  The student  can work during school breaks, so the forgone  earnings do not equal a
full-year of potential  earnings, but only 60 percent of a full-year.  Then K = 0.60, and the
rate of return is r = b/K =  (1.67)b.  A coefficient  of schooling  of .06 (or, six percent),
which might seem low, would imply a rate of return of .10 or 10 percent.
Alternatively,  consider a situation in which the student pays for tuition and all school fees
and supplies, and other out-of-pocket  expenditures  related to schooling. Suppose  the direct
and foregone earnings equal 150 percent of potential  earnings or K =  1.5.  Then if b =  .06,
r =  .06/1.5 = 0.04 or 4 percent.  Very different interpretations  emerge depending on the
value of  K.
The value of  r or K for a country need not be constant across schooling  levels.  One
may think of three levels of schooling, years of primary (P), years of middle or secondary
(M), and years of tertiary or higher (H) education. Then,
(7)  LnE. = LnE,+ (rpK)P  +  (r,,K)M  +  (rhKh)H,
where S  =  P+M+H.
The K's may vary by level of schooling. If, as it does in many developing  countries,
secondary schooling  involves  tuition charges as well as foregone earnings, Km  may exceed
unity; if higher education  involves subsidized  tuition, fees and living expenses (i.e., lowering
forgone  earnings), Kh  may be less than unity.  Interpretations  regarding the relative rates of
return from different levels of schooling  can be influenced  by the estimated values of K.
An alternative  procedure is to use dummy variables for each year of schooling  or for
each level of schooling. For example, we can define Dp, Dm  and Dh as dummy  variables that7
are unity if the person has completed  primary (p), secondary (m), and higher (h) education,
respectively.  Then the regression coefficient  of the dummy variable D, is rjKjSj,  where Sj  is
the number of years of schooling  for education  level D,.
Thus far, the discussion  has been in terms of private costs and private benefits.  The
implied rate of return is a private rate of return,  The HCEF procedure allows for the
computation  of the "social" rate of return (r*), defined as the rate of return based on total
costs (private and social or public costs) and private benefits.'  The regression  coefficient  is
still b, but the interpretation  is b =  r*K*, where K* incorporates  the social cost of the
investment.
Consider the following  scenario:  Foregone earnings constitute  75 percent of potential
full-year earnings, and there are no tuition charges, school fees or other out-of-pocket
expenses  paid by the individual, but the cost to the public not paid by the individual  is 50
percent of a student's full-year  potential  earnings.  The regression  coefficient  is 0.06.  The
private rate of return is:
r  =  b/K  =  .06/.75  =  0.080,  or 8.0 percent.
The social rate of return is:
r'  =  b*/K* =  .06/1.25  =  0.048,  or 4.8 percent.
With an estimate of K and K*, which can be estimated on a group basis, not needing micro-
level or individual  data, both private and social rates of return can be computed.
4This  concept of the social rate of return does not include what are referred to in the
literature as the externalities  from schooling.8
Recall that if we do not make use of the approximation regarding the natural logarithm of
a number close to one:
The private rate of  return is,  (e b- 1 )
K
Similarly, the social rate of return is,  r*  =(e  b  1)
K*
Hence the typical assumption that the coefficient of schooling in the HCEF is the rate of
return from  schooling is not correct in principle,  and is approximately correct only if K  =  1
and the regression coefficient is a small number,
IV. Effects of other Explanatory  Variables
The HCEF is highly adaptable, and a variety of variables have been added to the right-
hand side.  The most important and imaginative of these has been post-school labor market
experience in Mincer's  classic study (1974).  Mincer shows that the coefficient of schooling9
is biased downward if age rather than labor market experience is held constant.5 Moreover,
he develops the rationale for the now standard quadratic form for the experience variable.
Measures  of employment (labor supply) can be incorporated into the analysis. Let Ea
equal annual earnings and Eh equal hourly earnings, where W is weeks worked in the year
and H is hours worked per week.  Then,  E=Eh(W)Y,(H)Y2,  where  -y, i =  1,2, is the
elasticity of earnings with respect to time worked.  Then,
(8)  LnlEa = LnEh  +  YA(LnW) +  Y2(LnH),
where  LnEh,  is replaced by the human capital earnings function variables,  schooling,
experience,  etc.  Suppose the elasticity of earnings with respect to time units worked is unity,
that is, -yl and  72  are unity.  Then, a  10 percent  increase in time units worked (weeks or
hours) increases annual earnings by 10 percent.
5  If LnY  =  bo +  b,  S  +b2 T,  where  T equals Age-S-Z,  that is,  potential labor market
experience is the number of  years since leaving school (S+Z),  where  Z  is the age at which
school is started.  Then LnY  = bo +  b1 S +b2 (A-S-Z) =  (be- Zb2) +  (b, - b2) S + b2 A.  In
some circumstances, especially in developing countries where schooling attainment is very low,
potential labor market experience (T) should be measured a non-negative number which is as the
lesser of:
T  =  Age-S-Z, and
T  = Age - X,
where X is the age of the onset of employment that provides labor market experience relevant
for adult work.  The level of potential labor market experience may also need to be adjusted for
grade repetition.10
Note, however, that labor supply decisions  (time worked) are not exogenous  with respect
to wage rates.  This raises issues of endogenous  explanatory  variables which are typically
ignored.  As a result, however, the elasticity of earnings with respect to time units worked
may exceed unity.  This arises if labor supply  curves are upward rising.  It also arises if data
are available  for weeks worked but not hours worked per week, and yet weeks worked and
hours worked per week are positively correlated.
Alternatively,  the elasticity of earnings with respect to time units worked may be less
than unity.  This arises if labor supply curves are backward  bending (i.e., the income effect
of a higher wage dominates  the substitution  effect) or if there is anticipated  variable period
(peak-load)  employment. Seasonality  of employment,  for example, would result in higher
weekly  earnings, but lower annual earnings for those who work fewer weeks in the year if,
say, there is unemployment  in the off season which is compensated  at a lower rate.  A
similar situation  may arise for hours worked per week.  Purely random measurement  errors
will tend to bias -y  downward, resulting in a measured y less than unity even if the true
population  value is unity.
The expression  in equation  8 permits the estimation of the elasticities  of earnings with
respect to time units worked, where the interesting  null hypothesis  is that -yl =  Y2 =  1.
Empirically, for developed  countries the elasticity  of earnings with respect to weeks worked
is often close to unity, while the elasticity with respect to hours worked is substantially  and
significantly  below unity.
This issue is particularly relevant because of a tendency  to convert the dependent  variable
from annual earnings into hourly earnings. Then, transforming  equation (8),11
(9)  Ln( a)  = LnE,+(yl-l)Ln(W)+(y 2 -l)Ln(H).
However,  when hourly earnings is the dependent variable, whether observed or
constructed,  variables for weeks worked per year and hours worked per  week are generally
not included in the regression equation.  Then, to the extent that -yj  does not equal unity and
the time worked variable is correlated with an included variable, the coefficient of the
included variable is biased.  For example, suppose wyi  <  1 and -y2 <  1 and that those with
more schooling work more weeks in the year and more hours per week.  If the dependent
variable is computed hourly earnings (Ea/WH), the coefficient of schooling is biased
downwards.  This results in a downward biased estimate of the rate of return from  schooling.
Another variable that can bias the coefficient of schooling is an alternative measure of labor
market success.  Consider the effects of putting occupational dummy variables,  an
occupational prestige score,  or a variable for living in a low-income area on the right hand
side of the equation.  Then the regression estimates the effect of schooling on earnings within
an occupational or household income strata.  The coefficient does not incorporate the effect
of schooling in raising occupational level and household income.  It is not that this approach
is "wrong"  but that it tends to result in incorrect interpretations.  Consider the following
equation:
(10)  LnE  = bo +b,'S+b2
1OCC,
where OCC  =  1 for professionals  and managers and OCC  =  0 otherwise.  The effect of
schooling on earnings is:12
(11)  8aLnE  I  1aoCC
as  ~b+ 2 as
The coefficient of schooling b,'  is a downward biased estimate of the partial effect of
schooling on earnings.  It merely measures the average effect of schooling on earnings within
occupational strata.  The coefficient b2'  is the effect of a higher occupational strata on
earnings and  aocC  is the effect of schooling on occupational status.  It is not the
as
coefficient of schooling, but rather  aLnE  =  b, +b2  ..  that is the estimated value of
as  as
rK.  Similarly, stratifying the data by measures of labor market success (e.g.,  within
occupational categories) and computing regression  equations within strata also biases
downward the coefficient of schooling.
When interpreted correctly,  the HCEF can be an invaluable tool for estimating the rate of
return from schooling.13
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